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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1977, Oklahoma charged a registered member of the
Muscogee Creek Nation for crimes committed against another tribal
member on reservation lands.1 After a jury found him guilty, he was
sentenced to 500 years in prison and life without parole.2 Forty-two
years later, his conviction was reviewed on writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court.3 On appeal, he argued that
Oklahoma had no jurisdiction to prosecute him, as the act was
committed in Indian country and he was a registered member of the
Muscogee Creek Nation.4 Despite Oklahoma exercising criminal
jurisdiction over the land in question for more than 100 years, the
United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that for
purposes of the Indian Major Crimes Act, the land reserved for the

*Maria Conversa, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022, UIC School of Law. Thank
you to those whom have supported my dreams of going to law school and
continue to encourage me to advocate for change. I chose this topic to discuss
restorative justice, but also to shed light on the injustices indigenous persons
continue to face in this country. To my father, who has taught me strength. To
my mother, who has taught me empathy. And to W.T., who consistently
challenges me to be better. Your collective influence has been imperative to my
academic career.
Throughout this Note, the terms “Native American” and “Indian” are used
interchangeably. “Indian” is primarily used in this Note when referencing
specific laws, treaties, or cases that explicitly include the term “Indian.” “Native
American” (also commonly referred to as “American Indian” or “Indigenous
American” outside of this Note) is used to refer to a person with ancestry
originating from a tribe from the Contiguous United States, as well as Alaska,
who maintain their tribal affiliation.
1. See McGirt v. State, No. F-1997-967 (Okla. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 1998)
(listing the surrounding facts and circumstances that led to the multiple
criminal charges by the State of Oklahoma against Jimcy McGirt for sexual
crimes committed against a four-year-old girl in Broken Arrow, OK).
2. See id. (finding Jimcy McGirt guilty on three counts of criminal sexual
crimes by a jury in Oklahoma state criminal court and issuing his criminal
sentencing).
3. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, PC-2018-1057, cert. granted, (U.S. Dec. 13, 2019)
(No. 18-9526) (granting certiorari by the United States Supreme Court to
determine whether Oklahoma courts can continue to unlawfully exercise, under
state law, criminal jurisdiction as justiciable matter in Indian country over
Indians accused of major crimes enumerated under the Indian Major Crimes
Act, which are under exclusive federal jurisdiction).
4. See McGirt v. Warden Bryant, WH-2017-0022 (2017) (basing his appeal
on the notion that the state of Oklahoma did not have the jurisdiction to
prosecute him since he is a member Muscogee Creek Nation and the act
occurred on lands promised to the Muscogee Creek Nation tribe in the 1832
treaty and that the federal government).
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Muscogee Creek Nation in Oklahoma constituted Indian Country.5
As a result, Oklahoma could not legally try a Muscogee Creek
Nation citizen in state court for criminal conduct, thereby reversing
McGirt’s conviction.6
One hundred and eighty-nine years ago, in 1832, Congress
made a promise to the Muscogee Creek Nation of American Indians
and guaranteed them fixed borders for a “permanent home to the
whole Creek Nation of Indians.”7 This promise granted land in fee
simple8 to the Muscogee Creek Nation to continue so long as they
existed as a Nation and occupied the lands.9 Jump ahead to 2019
and Oklahoma insists that the Muscogee Creek Reservation had
been disestablished as a result of persistent white-settler movement
and the continued prosecution of Indians in Oklahoma state
courts.”10 In rejecting Oklahoma’s argument, the Supreme Court
held, in a landmark decision fortifying tribal rights, that only the
federal government—not Oklahoma—may prosecute tribal
members for major crimes committed in Indian country.11
McGirt is a staggering decision that fortifies federal tribal
rights observed by treaties with Congress. The majority in McGirt
took a textual approach in deciding “whether the land [the] treaties
[originally] promised remains an Indian reservation for purposes of
federal criminal law.”12 Throughout this Case Note’s analysis, the
majority and dissenting opinions will be examined to identify the
different modes of interpretation used to determine the fate of
federal tribal rights. Part II will discuss the Indian Major Crimes
Act to explain how the statute grants the federal government
criminal jurisdiction over tribal lands. Part III will discuss the
history behind the Treaty with the Muscogee Creek Nation to create
5. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (2020) (holding that the
state of Oklahoma lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to criminally prosecute
Jimcy McGirt for the major crimes of rape, sodomy, and molestation, which are
enumerated crimes in the Indian Major Crimes Act committed on lands that
constitute Indian country).
6. Id.
7. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459 (citing 1933 Treaty with the Creeks, preamble,
7 Stat. 417).
8. A form of ownership in real property representing the full and entire
interest.
9. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2461.
10. Id. at 2457 (Oklahoma arguing that its “long historical prosecutorial
practice of asserting jurisdiction over Indians in state court, even for serious
crimes on the contested lands” demonstrated its ability to prosecute petitioner,
“Jimcy McGirt, [for] molesting, raping, and forcibly sodomizing a four-year-old
girl.”).
11. Id. at 2478.
12. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2460 (reasoning that Congress had not clearly
expressed that the lands promised did not remain Indian country, so the land
remained Indian country for purposes of the Indian Major Crimes Act, thus
subjecting Jimcy McGirt to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the federal
government).
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a backdrop for the Supreme Court’s discussion. Part IV will look at
the Court’s analysis in interpreting the Treaty. Finally, this Case
Note will argue that the majority’s method is overly broad in
application and that the Muscogee Creek Nation tribe should have
the sole authority to prosecute their members without federal
interference because of their traditional values and adherence to
the philosophies of restorative justice.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Indian Major Crimes Act (MCA): What is Included?
According to the Indian Major Crimes Act (“MCA”), originally
enacted in 1885, any Indian who commits certain offenses “shall be
subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons
committing any of [those] offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States.”13 For purposes of the MCA, the term “Indian
country” encompasses:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent . . . (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States . . . and whether within or without the limits of
a State, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished.14
The enumerated crimes include, among others, “murder,
incest, felony child abuse or neglect, and an assault against an
individual who has not attained the age of sixteen years.”15

B. Hostility - The Context of the Treaties
At the turn of the 18th century, the Muscogee Creek Nation was
forced to vacate their ancestral lands in modern-day Alabama and
Georgia while receiving assurances that the lands in the west would
be theirs forever.16 Between “1802 and 1833, the Creeks ceded their
homelands, which spanned millions of acres.”17 In consideration for
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1949).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1949).
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1949) (enumerating crimes designated as major
crimes for purposes of the applicable statute).
16. See 1832 Treaty, Art. XIV, 7 Stat. 368 (guaranteeing to the Creek
Indians the country west of the Mississippi without any interference by any
state or territory in the pursuit of the Creek Indians right to self-govern and
granting a land patent to be executed to the Creek tribe as soon as the
boundaries of the Creek country West of the Mississippi are ascertained).
17. Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and Cherokee Nation
in Support of Petitioner at 4, McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (No.
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the Muscogee Creek Nation parting with their land East of the
Mississippi river, the “government agreed by treaty that ‘[t]he
Creek country west of the Mississippi shall be solemnly
guarantee[e]d to the Creek Indians’”18 and that “[n]o State or
Territory [shall] ever have a right to pass laws for the government
of such Indians, but [that] they shall be allowed to govern
themselves.”19 This was part of a federal effort to relocate Native
Americans to permanent reservations in order to achieve the
contemporaneous goal of separating Native Americans from white
settlers.20
There are two treaties that were enacted that are directly
relevant to Jimcy McGirt’s argument on appeal: the 1832 Indian
Removal Treaty and the 1833 Treaty promising fee simple title to
the Creek Nation so long as they continue to exist and occupy the
land granted to them.21 Recognizing the general hostility towards
Native Americans during this era is important in understanding
the later actions taken by Oklahoma in its unlawful prosecutorial
practices.
1. Creek Occupancy Over Eastern Lands
By 1790, there was a long history of the Muscogee Creek
Nation tribe occupying vast stretches of land in the east, including
land “in the present states of Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi.”22
As white settlers began to migrate onto Muscogee Creek lands,
there were efforts to remove tribal members from the east and
relocate them west in order to enter Alabama, Georgia, and
Mississippi into statehood.23 With these efforts, hostility towards
the tribes grew as more white settlers were occupying the eastern
regions of the continent and believed that Native Americans were
incapable of civilization.24 The Muscogee Creek Nation wished to
18-9526).
18. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459 (citing 1832 Treaty, Arts. I, XIV, 7 Stat. 366,
368).
19. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459 (citing 1832 Treaty, Art. XIV, 7 Stat. 368).
20. See Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and Cherokee
Nation in Support of Petitioner, supra note 17 (describing the federal policy and
public hostility towards Indian people and the tendency to separate non-Indians
from Indians).
21. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2460 (noting the two treaties implicated as a
result of Jimcy McGirt’s appeal).
22. United States v. Creek Nation, 476 F.2d 1290, 1292 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
23. See Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and Cherokee
Nation in Support of Petitioner, supra note 17, (chronicling the hostility towards
Indian tribes by the territories trying to enter statehood).
24. See id. (noting the negative public opinion towards Indian tribes,
historically and commonly referred to as the “Indian Problem,” and explaining
the Native Americans’ common refusal to compromise their traditional way of
life in order to assimilate to the culture of the white settlers that were
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remain in Alabama because the land held religious significance and
was the last enclave of their ancestral lands. Ultimately, they were
compelled to cede their ancestral lands and were forcibly moved
westward.25
2. 1832 Treaty with the Creeks
Understandably, the Muscogee Creek Nation’s removal was
met with resistance, as its members did not wish to uproot their
livelihoods from their ancestral lands.26 In response, the
government created a treaty between the increasing number of
white settlers and the Muscogee Creek Nation in an effort to
persuade the Muscogee Creek Chiefs to cede their lands.27 Although
the terms of the removal are commonly referred to as a “treaty,” this
hardly constituted an agreement since the Muscogee Creek Nation
was legally powerless to protect their land.28 As such, it is more
appropriate to view this situation as a “forced removal,” rather than
a “treaty.”29 Nonetheless, it will be referred to as a treaty for
clarification purposes throughout this Note. In 1832, the treaty was
signed by Lewis Cass and the Muscogee Creek Nation.30 Lewis Cass
was an American military officer, politician, and statesman who
accepted the appointment as Secretary of War under President
Andrew Jackson in 1831.31 This treaty was relatively concise and
consisted of fifteen articles.32 The treaty primarily required the
Muscogee Creek Nation to “cede to the United States all their land,

increasingly taking over their ancestral lands).
25. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2483 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
26. See The Muscogee Creek Nation, Culture History Videos-Removal to
Allotment, MUSCOGEE CREEK NATION (last visited Nov. 2, 2021),
www.muscogeenation.com/culturehistory/history-videos/
[perma.cc/XBG7VAXX] [hereafter Muscogee Videos] (mentioning the fast rate of white settlers
invading Creek lands and the general resistance of Creek tribe members to
removal thus leading to federal efforts to deal with the ‘Indian Problem’).
27. Id.
28. ANGIE DEBO, THE ROAD TO DISAPPEARANCE: A HISTORY OF THE CREEK
INDIANS 129 (1941) (“In 1833 they had been tricked into signing such an
agreement”).
29. Muscogee Videos, supra note 26 (recounting the tragedies Creek
members faced due to forcible removal and explaining how Creek members were
without legal or political power to defend their ancestral lands and were
peaceful people trying to avoid combat).
30. See 1832 Treaty, 7 Stat., 366 (listing the endorsed names of the executors
of the treaty at the end of the agreement).
31. See WILLARD C. KLUNDER, LEWIS CASS AND THE POLITICS OF
MODERATION 67 (1996) (narrating the history of President Andrew Jackson’s
appointment of Lewis Cass as the secretary of war and delegating the authority
to him to help implement President Jackson’s Indian Removal policies).
32. See 1832 Treaty, 7 Stat., 366 (containing fifteen articles within the
document).
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East of the Mississippi river.”33 Arguably, the most important
provision of this treaty was Article 14, which provided that “the
Creek country west of the Mississippi shall be solemnly guaranteed
to the Creek Indians.”34 The Article also guaranteed that no other
State or Territory would ever have the right to pass laws for the
Indians.35 The effect of this Article was that it guaranteed the
Muscogee Creek Nation’s right to self-governance, so long as it was
compatible with the general jurisdiction which Congress thought
proper to exercise over them.36
3. Tribal Recognition in the Courts: The Marshall Trilogy
Fearful that “only the acquisition of the white man’s culture
would save the Creeks from extinction,”37 the chief leaders of the
Muscogee Creek Nation “tried to maintain peace between the
invading settlers and those Creek factions who actively resisted the
invasion.”38 These efforts were ultimately unsuccessful even though
the Muscogee Creek Nation had long self-governed.39 The Muscogee
Creek Nation needed stronger protections and recognition of their
lands.
Three seminal cases commemorating the history of Indian law
in the Supreme Court are now referred to as “the Marshall
Trilogy.”40 In 1823, Chief Justice John Marshall authored the
opinion of Johnson v. M’Intosh, which established federal
supremacy over the states regarding Indian affairs.41 In 1831 and
1832, out east, among resistance from Georgia, the Court issued two
landmark decisions, Worcester v. Georgia and Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia.42 These cases recognized Cherokee Nation rights and held
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. DEBO, supra note 28, at 85.
38. Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and Cherokee Nation
in Support of Petitioner, supra note 17, at 5.
39. See id. (noting the efforts of Muscogee Creek leaders in trying to
maintain peace with the settlers and federal government).
40. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the
Supreme
Court,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
MAG.
(Oct.
1,
2014),
www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home
/2014_vol_40/vol--40--no--1--tribal-sovereignty/short_history_of_indian_law
(describing the United States Supreme Court’s history of interpreting Federal
Indian Law and the three seminal cases recognizing tribal rights and affirming
both the political and legal standing of the remaining Indian nations while also
establishing federal authority over many Indian affairs).
41. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 604 (1823) (establishing the
federal government’s authority to oversee Indian affairs and the Supreme
Court’s recognition of the federal government’s legitimacy in handling such
matters).
42. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 540 (1832) (holding that the law
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that Georgia laws did not apply on Cherokee Nation land43 as the
Cherokee Nation was regarded as a “domestic dependent nation.”44
In defining tribal sovereign powers, the Court described tribes
as domestic dependent nations, “meaning that although tribes were
distinct independent political communities, they remained subject
to the paternalistic powers of the United States.”45 After these
decisions were issued and the 1833 treaty was executed, Muscogee
Creek Nation members were hopeful because they were promised
relatively strong protections against state regulation.46 However,
the implementation of the treaty was nothing short of disastrous.47
Due to the hostility and savagery from an increasing amount of nonIndian settlers, thousands of Muscogee Creek Nation members died
en route to their promised lands.48 In the twenty-year period after
the treaty, the Muscogee Creek Nation population decreased by
more than 10,000 citizens.49 Discussion of the Marshall Trilogy is
important because it codified the concept that the federal
government, not the states, had the jurisdiction to prosecute
Indians — the very issue the Supreme Court deals with in McGirt.

of the State of Georgia that redrew the boundaries of Indian lands and
criminalized living on Indian lands was inconsistent with the treaties made
with the tribes because it went against the very notion found in treaties that
actually civilized the Indian tribes and therefore would not be upheld because
the State of Georgia had no right to interfere with an agreement between the
federal government and the tribes); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17
(1831).
43. See cases cited supra note 41 (set of three Supreme Court cases that
demonstrate Court’s recognition that states couldn’t exercise power over tribal
lands).
44. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
45.
Our
Government,
PAUMA BAND OF LUISEÑO INDIANS,
www.paumatribe.com/government/tribal-sovereignty
[perma.cc/TJP6-X273]
(last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (internal quotations omitted).
46. See 1832 Treaty, Art. XIV, 7 Stat., 366 (promising the tribes the country
west of the Mississippi and preventing any State or Territory from having a
right to pass laws for the government of such Indians, but that the Creeks shall
be allowed to govern themselves, also stating that the United States will also
defend the Creeks from the unjust hostilities of other Indians, and will cause a
patent or grant to be executed to the Creek tribe).
47. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 22 (1984) (recounting the
complexities of implementation of the treaty and the public resistance to the
policies that liberally recognized tribal rights).
48. Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and Cherokee Nation
in Support of Petitioner, supra note 17, at 8 (citing GRANT FOREMAN, THE FIVE
CIVILIZED TRIBES: CHEROKEE, CHICKASAW, CHOCTAW, CREEK, SEMINOLE
(1934)).
49. Id.
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4. Abrading Tribal Authority: Trail of Tears through
Allotment
As a result of the forced removal of the Muscogee Creek Nation,
approximately 23,000 tribal members forcibly marched on the
5,043-mile agonizing journey to their land out west — a journey
commonly referred to as the Trail of Tears.50 The Trail of Tears is
the most blatant example of the unfortunate tragedy and loss faced
by the tribes and is of critical significance because the Treaty of
1832 was the inception of their travel westward to Oklahoma.
Although the Muscogee Creek Nation encountered terrible tragedy
and loss, once arriving out west, they remained courageous and
eager to establish strong tribal towns.51 The Muscogee Creek Nation
was able to establish towns by building new homes and schools in
an effort to strengthen their tribe and independent republic.52
a. Fee Patent of 1852
Despite state attempts to diminish the control of tribal leaders
over their people, the Treaty granting the Muscogee Creek Nation
their lands was reinforced by a fee patent.53 This patent, executed
on August 11, 1852, by the President, versed title in them as a
tribe.54 The effect was that they would continue “to exist as a nation
and continue to occupy the country thereby assigned to them.”55
With time, the Creek Nation was able to establish towns, schools, a
police force, and tribal courts that exercised both civil and criminal
jurisdiction over its members.56 This demonstrated the tribe’s
ability to self-govern without state intervention. Notwithstanding
that the Muscogee Creek Nation was independently functioning

50. See Trail of Tears, HISTORY (Nov. 9, 2009), www.history.com/topics/
native-american-history/trail-of-tears
[perma.cc/VT8B-GTPB]
(last
visited Oct. 20, 2021) (estimating the number of Native American tribes
negatively impacted by the coercive, tragic, and deadly journey known as the
“Trail of Tears” and how this history shaped many territories eventual entry
into statehood).
51. See Muscogee Videos, supra note 26 (describing the resilience of Creek
members upon arriving to their new lands in the West and the hope they had
to build a strong independent republic for their tribe despite the numerous
tragedies they endured).
52. Id.
53. Brief for Amicus Curiae Muscogee (Creek) Nation in Support of
Petitioner, McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (No. 18-9526) at 6 (citing
Fee Patent, Aug, 11, 1852, Land Title Plant, Muscogee Creek Nation, Book
1:748).
54. Id.
55. Woodward v. De Graffenried, 238 U.S. 284, 293 (1915).
56. See DEBO, supra note 28, at 181-82 (listing the Creek’s governmental
accomplishments with their new land out West and their efforts to legitimize
their tribe).
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successfully, the settlers’ desire “for more land in the western
United States by the late nineteenth century was . . . [a]
precipitating factor”57 in the federal allotment and assimilation era.
b. The Dawes Commission
The Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek and, Seminole
tribes expressed opposition to reaching an agreement on the
allotment of their lands.58 In response, the Dawes Commission was
created to assist the division of tribal land into plots that were
subsequently divided among the members of the tribe.59 After ten
years of negotiations with the Five Civilized Tribes, the Dawes
Commission finally secured allotment agreements with each of the
tribes.60 Coercive laws that threatened the extinction of tribal
courts were among the main reason these tribes agreed to the
allotments.61 As a part of the Dawes Commission’s work, Congress
enacted the Dawes Act in 1897, which was among the first laws
created to force the five tribes to confer with the Dawes
Commission.62 The statute provided that the federal courts in
Indian Territory have original and exclusive jurisdiction—as
opposed to the states—for criminal offenses.63Although the Dawes
Commission was created to coerce the tribes into allotment
agreements, their land remained federal Indian country.

57. Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and Cherokee Nation
in Support of Petitioner, supra note 17, at 10.
58. Id.
59.
See
Dawes
Commission,
CHEROKEE
HERITAGE
CTR.,
www.cherokeeheritage.org/cherokeeheritagegenealogy-html/dawescommission/ [perma.cc/2YHZ-JC34] (last visited Oct. 20, 2021) (chronicling the
creation of the Dawes Commission to aid in negotiations with the tribes in order
to secure allotment of their plots of lands).
60. See Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and Cherokee
Nation in Support of Petitioner, supra note 17, at 12 (noting that “[i]t required
10 years of negotiations for the Dawes Commission to secure allotment
agreements with all five tribes”).
61. Id.
62. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1441 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (citing Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 83) (listing the coercive
tactics used by the federal government to force the Five Civilized Tribes to
expedite negotiations with the Dawes Commission to further the federal agenda
of allotment).
63. See Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and Cherokee
Nation in Support of Petitioner, supra note 17, at 13 (citing 30 Stat. 62, 83)
(stating that after “January 1, 1898, the federal courts in Indian Territory ‘shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction and authority to try and determine all
. . . criminal causes for the punishment of any offense committed’ after that
date.”). An additional condition provided that that “any agreement with a tribe,
when ratified would ‘operate to suspend any provisions of this Act if in conflict
therewith to said nation.’” Id.
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Federal Legislation: Major Crimes Act (MCA)

As the creation of the Dawes Commission created momentum
for federal legislation regulating Indian affairs, Congress needed to
address the occurrence of crimes that arose in Indian Country
between tribal members. The MCA was enacted by Congress in
1885 to confer federal jurisdiction over specific crimes by a Native
American offender when committed on an Indian reservation
within a state or federal territory.64 This statute is central to this
case because McGirt’s argument that Oklahoma did not have the
jurisdiction to criminally prosecute him is based on an application
and interpretation of the MCA.65
d. The Curtis Act
In another attempt to diminish tribal authority, Congress
passed the Curtis Act in 1898, which threatened to abolish “all
tribal courts in Indian Territory” and remove all tribal cases,
including civil and criminal, to federal court while containing an
exception for the tribes that ratified the allotment agreements.66
Since the Muscogee Creek Nation failed to ratify the allotment
agreement by the required deadline, the final allotment agreement
proclaimed that the agreement was not to be interpreted to
reinstate the power of the Muscogee Creek National tribal courts.67
The effect of the Curtis Act resulted in the eradication of
Muscogee Creek Nation tribal courts.68 As such, the Department of
the Interior Courts of Indian Offenses had started to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over tribal members.69 However, the Muscogee
Creek Nation was able to procure their jurisdiction back when the
Curtis Act was repealed.70 On par with the repeal of the Curtis Act,
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1948).
65. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459 (“Mr. McGirt’s appeal rests on the Federal
Major Crimes Act.”).
66. See Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495 (containing a favorable
exception for tribes who ratified the allotment agreement in order to incentivize
tribal cooperation with the government).
67. See Woodward, 238 U.S. at 311-12 (describing the nature of the
allotment agreement and the 3,000,000 acres of land owned by the Creek
Indians that were implicated as a result thereof).
68. M. Kaye Tatro, Curtis Act (1898), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF O.K. HISTORY AND
CULTURE,
www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=CU006
[perma.cc/9KU3-KAMG].
69. See For the removal of restrictions from part of the lands of allottees of
the Five Civilized Tribes, and for other purposes, Sec. 13, 35 Stat. 312 (1908),
(granting the Department of the Interior temporary criminal jurisdiction over
Indians).
70. See Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1446-47 (repealing the Curtis Act and finding
that the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936 conferred all powers associated
with self-government on the Creek tribe because it gave the tribe the authority
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in 1901, all members of the Five Civilized Tribes were made US
citizens while still maintaining their tribal citizenship rights.71
Later, in 1924, all Native Americans won citizenship under the
Indian Citizenship Act.72 This is historically significant because it
symbolized the federal government’s recognition of the tribes as
sovereigns, therefore supporting McGirt’s argument that Oklahoma
did not have the jurisdiction to criminally prosecute him.73
e.

Federal Legislation: Five Civilized Tribes Act

Enacted in 1906, the Five Civilized Tribes Act is recognized as
the final act that led to Oklahoma’s statehood. In this Act, Congress
empowered the President to remove and replace the tribal chief
leader of the Muscogee Creek Nation and to prohibit the tribal
council from meeting more than thirty days a year and directed the
Secretary of the Interior to assume control of tribal schools74 and
the Department of the Interior started to exercise dominion over
tribal government. Despite these numerous intrusions into
Muscogee Creek Nation’s power, Congress did not enact a statute
that led to the total surrender of tribal interests in the Indian lands,
nor did Congress expressly indicate a desire to do so.75 This is a key
argument for the majority in their textual approach in determining
whether Congress clearly expressed its intent to disestablish the
Creek reservation for purposes of the MCA.76
f.

Oklahoma Entered Statehood

In 1890, Congress began to carve out territory from Indian
to adopt its own constitution in furtherance of its right to self-organize for the
common welfare).
71. See Muscogee Videos, supra note 26 (recounting the granting of United
States citizenship to Creek Nation tribe members while they remained
recognized as tribal members with tribal rights).
72. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1952) (marking the end of a long battle to receive
full birthright citizenship in the United States of America for all American
Indians, named the Indian Citizenship Act and signed by President Calvin
Coolidge into law on June 2, 1924).
73. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2456-57 (recognizing McGirt’s postconviction
argument that the state of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him
because he is an enrolled member of the Muscogee Creek Nation and his crime
took place on the reservation lands of the Muscogee Creek Nation).
74. Id. at 2466 (explaining the how the Act gave the President the authority
to severely limit tribal autonomy).
75. See id. at 2463 (explaining that to determine whether a tribe continues
to hold a reservation on its lands, the court will look to the acts of congress, and
if Congress desires to disestablish an Indian reservation, Congress must clearly
express its intent to do so, the Court also recognizing the historical instances in
which Congress had clearly expressed its intent to disestablish a reservation
but that these actions were not present in the current case).
76. Id.
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lands to become present-day Oklahoma, and the long-debated
issues of jurisdiction began.77 Although the MCA conferred federal
jurisdiction on enumerated criminal offenses within Indian
territory, the Five tribes “retained exclusive jurisdiction over all
civil and criminal disputes involving only tribal members.”78 The
Oklahoma Enabling Act of 1906 authorized Oklahoma courts to
create and adopt their own criminal laws to employ and execute
Oklahoma criminal laws to crimes that were subject to state
jurisdiction.79 The Act preserved federal jurisdiction over Native
Americans and their lands, requiring Oklahoma to disclaim all
rights and titles to such lands.80 At the time that Oklahoma entered
statehood, there was no official Muscogee Creek Nation reservation
since the lands were either allotted to the members of the tribes or
held by the government in trust.81 However, under the definition of
the MCA, these lands remained Indian country for purposes of the
MCA.82 The fact that the lands remained Indian lands is
predominant in the majority’s analysis because it demonstrates the
applicability of the MCA, thus granting the federal government—
not Oklahoma—the jurisdiction to prosecute tribal members.83

C. Shifting Attitude: Re-affirming Tribal Authority
As the twentieth century was underway, the public and federal
opinion towards Native Americans was changing.84 In the 1920s,
there were federal efforts that suggested the consensus was
changing “away from assimilation policies and toward more
tolerance and respect for traditional aspects of Indian culture.”85
77. See Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and Cherokee
Nation in Support of Petitioner, supra note 17, at 19 (citing § 33-35, 26 Stat. 81.
(“When Congress carved Oklahoma territory out of Indian territory in 1890,
Congress specified the jurisdiction to be exercised by [the] courts over the
reduced federal Indian Territory.”)).
78. Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n,
829 F.2d 967, 977-78 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
79. Oklahoma Enabling Act of 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267.
80. See OKLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (preserving federal jurisdiction over Indian
matters and recognizing Indian rights to the land taking priority over
Oklahoma’s claims).
81. ROY GITTINGER, THE FORMATION OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 18031906 309 (1939).
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1948) (describing what constitutes Indian country
for purposes the exercise of exclusive federal jurisdiction applicable to the
enumerated crimes in the act).
83. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2482.
84. See Muskogee Videos, supra note 26 (expressing the changing public
opinion about Indians in the United States of America signaling a recognition
and respect for the Muscogee Creek Nation culture).
85. NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW § 1.05 (2019).
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1. Oklahoma Indiana Welfare Act (OIWA)
In 1936, “Congress authorized the Creek[s] to adopt a
constitution and bylaws enabling the Creek government to resume
many of its previously suspended functions.”86 The Oklahoma
Indiana Welfare Act (“OIWA”) was enacted due to the belief that
“Indian culture and Indian values had much to offer non-Indian
society and that Indian problems were best solved by Indians.”87
This Act stopped the allotment process, ended the further loss of
tribal lands, and reestablished tribal governments.88 In 1982, the
Muscogee Creek Nation passed an ordinance that re-established
both the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the Muscogee Creek
Nation’s courts by authorizing the Muscogee Creek Tribal Court to
exercise authority over its tribal members.89 Indeed, Oklahoma
began to enforce these tribal court judgments early on.90 This
recognition of tribal court judgments by Oklahoma courts tends to
undermine Oklahoma’s argument that they had the jurisdiction to
criminally prosecute tribal members for major crimes committed in
Indian country because they had been doing so for years.91
2.

Legitimizing the Muscogee Creek Nation

In 1944, the Muscogee General Convention adopted a new
constitution and bylaws, which merged the executive and legislative
branches into the Muscogee Creek Nation Indian Council.92
Throughout the 1960s, the federal government established multiple
86. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2467.
87. Muscogee Videos, supra note 26.
88. See id. (explaining the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier’s,
involvement in the movement to respect the cultural values of the tribes and
the steps he took to stop allotment in attempt to re-establish tribal courts and
tribal government).
89. See Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1446-47 (noting the enactment of the ordinance
the Creek Nation drafted to authorize their Creek Tribal Court to enforce both
civil and criminal jurisdiction over their members and describing the efforts of
the tribe to legitimize itself in other typical and conventional governmental
functions).
90. See Barrett v. Barrett, 878 P. 2d 1051, 1054 (Okla. 1994) (holding that
the court had previously adopted the approach that the courts of the State of
Oklahoma shall grant full faith and credit and cause to be enforced any tribal
judgment and that full faith and credit should be accorded with tribal court
decrees moving forward).
91. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2470 (evaluating Oklahoma’s argument that it
had the authority to criminally prosecute tribal members because they had done
so for many years).
92. See Muscogee Videos, supra note 26 (chronicling the independent efforts
of the Muscogee Creek Nation tribe to self-govern and retain authority over its
own tribe members and the commencement of the Muscogee General
Convention).

2021]

Righting the Wrongs of Native America Removal

947

task forces to review and stay informed on tribal decisions.93 With
these advancements, tribal governments asserted more control over
their tribe while the federal government remained involved at a
legislative level.94 This corroborates the policy behind the MCA by
recognizing tribal jurisdiction over tribal members, while the
federal government has the jurisdiction to prosecute for the major
crimes enumerated in the statute.

III. ANALYSIS
A. McGirt’s Crimes and Convictions
In 1996, Jimcy McGirt lived and committed the alleged crimes
in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma.95 Broken Arrow, Oklahoma is located
“on lands described as the Creek Reservation in . . . [a] treaty and
federal statute.”96 On Oct. 21, 1996, he was charged with first
degree rape, lewd molestation, and forcible sodomy.97 He was found
guilty by a jury in an Oklahoma state court on all three counts.98 In
1998 after his initial appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, his conviction was affirmed.99 In 2017, he filed a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that he was illegally detained because the
court that convicted him was without jurisdiction, but this writ was
denied.100 After a series of appeals, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address the issue of “[w]hether Oklahoma courts can
continue to unlawfully exercise, under state law, criminal
jurisdiction as justiciable matter in Indian country over Indians
accused of Major Crimes enumerated under the Indian Major
Crimes Act-which are under exclusive federal jurisdiction.”101
93. Id. (discussing establishment of the Commission on the Rights Liberties
and Responsibilities of the Indian 1966, Coleman Report 1966, White House
Task Force on Indian Health 1966, Indian Education: A National Tragedy-A
National Challenge 1969, American Indian Policy Review Commission 1977,
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs 1977).
94. Id.
95. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. __, 4
(2020) (expressing “[t]he alleged crimes were at Petitioner’s rural Broken
Arrow, Wagoner County, Oklahoma home in August 1996”).
96. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2460.
97. See McGirt, PC-2018-1057, (enumerating the charged offenses that
Jimcy McGirt faced from the State of Oklahoma and the Court’s convictions).
98. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, at 5 (stating the jury
found Petitioner guilty of all three counts recommending 500 years each for
counts 1 and 2 and life without parole for count 3).
99. See id. (detailing the appeal of Jimcy McGirt’s criminal conviction from
the Oklahoma state court and the affirmation of his conviction by the Oklahoma
Criminal Court of Appeals).
100. Order Affirming Denial of Application for Post-Conviction Relief at 3,
McGirt v. State, (No. 18-1057) (Okla. Crim. App. 2019).
101. McGirt, PC-2018-1057, cert. granted, (U.S. Dec. 13, 2019) (No. 18-9526).
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The Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that for purposes of
the MCA, “[o]nly the federal government, not the State, may
prosecute Indians for major crimes committed in Indian country.”102
The majority of the court took a textual approach103 to resolve the
issue before it.104 In contrast, the dissenters conducted a contextual
inquiry105 and concluded that “a reservation did not exist when
McGirt committed his crimes, so Oklahoma had jurisdiction to
prosecute him.”106
First, an understanding of the different approaches of
interpreting Congressional intent in the context of treaties is
needed. Second, the majority opinion authored by Justice Neil
Gorsuch will be examined to reveal the reasoning behind the textual
approach to statutory interpretation in this case.107 Third, the
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice John Roberts will be analyzed to
highlight his tendency to provide deference to Congress in his
decisions.108 Fourth, the dissenting opinion of Justice Clarence
Thomas will be dissected to reveal his view that the Court reversed
“a state-court judgment that it has no jurisdiction to review.”109

B. Only Congress Can Disestablish a Reservation
Despite their different approaches, both the majority and the
dissenters agreed that “[o]nce a federal reservation is established,
only Congress can diminish or disestablish it . . . [and] doing so
102. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2478.
103. See id. at 2469 (emphasizing the statutory interpretation framework
for discerning the original meaning of a law and mentioning that the Court only
looks to contemporaneous practices to shed light on ambiguous or vague
statutory language).
104. See id. at 2459 (stating the issue as whether Oklahoma courts can
continue to unlawfully exercise, under state law, criminal jurisdiction as
‘justiciable matter’ in Indian Country over Indians accused of major crimes
enumerated under the Indian Major Crimes Act – which are under exclusive
federal jurisdiction).
105. See id. at 2468 (emphasizing that the Court’s precedents require the
Court to start its statutory interpretation analysis with statutory text and then
examining all the circumstances surrounding the opening of the reservation to
then discern whether the contemporaneous and subsequent understanding of
the reservation’s status is affirmative or negative).
106. Id. at 2483 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 2463-64 (insisting that only Congress can disestablish a
reservation, disestablishment requires an Congressional expression of its intent
to do so and external sources should only be considered to resolve ambiguities).
108. See id. at 2497 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Court should
presume that governmental officials are exercising their duties in a lawful
manner and inferring that this deferential approach better accommodates the
case here because the majority is speculating as to whether governmental
officials in the state of Oklahoma conspired to violate the laws in prosecuting
for criminal acts of Indians).
109. Id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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requires a clear expression of congressional intent.”110 As such,
“[o]nly Congress can divest a reservation of its land and diminish
its boundaries.”111 Although both the majority and dissent agreed
that Congress has the sole authority here, they differed in
determining the Congressional intent to disestablish a
reservation.112

C. Majority’s Approach
Since the majority required that Congress “clearly express its
intent to disestablish a reservation, ‘commonly with an explicit
reference to cession or other language evidencing the present and
total surrender of all tribal interests,’”113 it follows that the Acts of
Congress had to be closely analyzed.114 The majority noted the
historical context of hostility surrounding Native Americans in
America but refused to read into Congress’ acts an intent to
disestablish the Creek reservation absent an express desire to do
so.115
1. Historical Context
Analogous to Part II of this Case Note,116 the majority in
McGirt spent some thirteen pages of its opinion recounting the
historical context surrounding the treaty with the Muscogee Creek
Nation.117 Although the majority noted numerous intrusions into
tribal authority,118 the requisite remained the same:
“[d]isestablishment has ‘never required any particular form of
words,’”119 “[b]ut it does require that Congress clearly express its
110. Id. at 2457.
111. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984).
112. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2469 (majority addressing dissenter’s
approach in analysis and how the correct approach is strictly textual).
113. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2463 (citing Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072,
1082 (2016)).
114. Id. at 2485.
115. See id. at 2462 (arguing that no matter how many promises the federal
government breaks with the tribes that may have disfigured trust between
them and ultimately led to abrogation of tribal authority, if Congress wants to
disestablish a reservation, it must explicitly say so).
116. See discussion supra Part II (narrarating the history of the Muscogee
Creek Nation before the execution of the treaty).
117. See generally McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2456-59 (reciting the various
historical events surrounding the treaty and noting that despite the
antagonistic attitude of the federal government towards the Indian tribes,
Congress failed to pass a statute that disestablished the Creek nation
reservation in Eastern Oklahoma).
118. See id. at 2462 (describing the events that clearly demonstrate
Congress has broken more than a few promises to the Muscogee Creek Nation
tribe including the land that was promised to be the solely the property of the
Creek Nation but eventually being divided into pieces from allotment by
Congress).
119. Id. at 2463 (citing Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 411 (1994)).
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intent to do so.”120 With this in mind, the majority carried on with
its opinion using a textual approach to resolve the issue before it.121
2. An Established Reservation
For the sake of clarity at the outset, the majority sought to
determine whether the Muscogee Creek Nation continued to hold a
reservation.122 The Court first looked to the Acts of Congress123 and
recognized that “[u]nder our Constitution, States have no authority
to reduce federal reservations lying with their borders.”124 The
majority was concerned that such state encroachment into federal
tribal jurisdiction would be dangerous because this “would be at
odds with the Constitution . . . [and i]t would also leave tribal rights
in the hands of the very neighbors who might be least inclined to
respect them.”125 Because there were numerous Congressional
intrusions into Muscogee Creek Nation authority but no particular
instance of Congress expressly demonstrating its intent to
disestablish the reservation, the Court held that the land remained
an Indian reservation for purposes of the federal criminal law.126
3. Allotment Era
Oklahoma argued that Congress expressed its intention to
disestablish the Creek reservation through its acts of allotment,
which divided the land into lots for sale to homesteaders.127 The
majority addressed this argument128 finding unpersuasive the

120. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2463 (citing Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1082).
121. See id. at 2474 (describing the ways Congress has disestablished a
reservation in the past and explaining that determining congressional intent
starts with the statute so the Court’s charge is to determine the original
meaning of the law).
122. See generally id. at 2459-69 (determining whether Congress created an
Indian reservation for the Muscogee Creek Nation while recounting historic
acts of Congress to resolve this issue).
123. See id. at 2462 (stating that to determine whether the Muscogee Creek
Nation tribe continues to hold a reservation for purposes of the Indian Major
Crimes Act, the place for the Court to look is at the acts of Congress and
explaining that the legislature has significant constitutional power to breach its
own treaties).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 2456 (holding that the land the treaty promised remains an
Indian reservation for purposes of federal criminal law).
127. See id. at 2463 (noting Oklahoma’s argument that Congress intended
to disestablish the Creek reservation through enactment of the Allotment Acts).
128. See generally id. at 2463-66 (addressing the state of Oklahoma’s
argument that the acts by Congress and the events that occurred in the
allotment era indicate disestablishment because it was the first step in a
Congressional plan that was aimed at total disestablishment).

2021]

Righting the Wrongs of Native America Removal

951

argument that “allotments automatically ended reservations.”129
Thus, “allotment under the . . . Act is completely consistent with
continued reservation status.”130 Importantly, “no matter how many
other promises to a tribe the federal government has already
broken[, i]f Congress wishes to break the promise of a reservation,
it must say so.”131 Citing to Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock132 and Solem v.
Bartlett,133 the majority recognized that the Legislature has broad
authority when dealing with tribal relations, but the Court will not
lightly infer a breach of a Congressional promise once Congress has
established a reservation.134 Consistent with this line of reasoning,
the majority found the Allotment Era, by itself, insufficient to
disestablish the reservation.135
Since Congress does not disestablish a reservation simply by
“allowing the transfer of individual plots whether to Native
Americans or others,”136 the majority rejected Oklahoma’s
argument that the purchase or transfer of lands by non-Indians is
inconsistent with the status of a reservation.137 Consistent with its
textual approach to statutory interpretation, the majority pointed
out that the MCA’s definition of ‘Indian Country’ “expressly
contemplates private land ownership within reservation boundaries
. . . [and therefore it is irrelevant] whether these individual parcels
have passed hands to non-Indians.”138 In concluding that the
Allotment Era, by itself, did not demonstrate Congressional intent
to disestablish the reservation,139 the majority recognized that
although “Congress may have passed allotment laws to create the
conditions for disestablishment . . . to equate allotment with
129. Id. at 2464.
130. Id. (citing Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368
U.S. 351, 356-358 (1962)).
131. McGirt, 140 S. Ct at 2462.
132. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (holding that the
power to abrogate provisions of a treaty exists with Congress, but such power
will only be recognized in circumstances which not only justify the government’s
disregard of the stipulation, but also when the interest of the United States and
tribes demand this result).
133. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984) (recognizing that
diminishment of Indian reservations will not lightly be inferred, and that
Congress must clearly evince an intent to change boundaries before
diminishment will be found).
134. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2462 (noting that the legislative power to
handle tribal relations is significant and that it belongs to Congress alone).
135. See id. at 2465, note 4 (rejecting the dissent’s approach that suggests
the passing of the allotment act itself extinguished title).
136. Id. at 2464 (citing Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 497 (1973); Seymour,
368 U.S. at 356-358).
137. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct at 2504, n. 3 (recognizing that the Court long ago
denied the contention that non-Indians purchasing Native lands was
inconsistent with reservation status).
138. Id. at 2464.
139. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2465.
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disestablishment would confuse the first step of a march with
arrival at its destination.”140 The Allotment Era did not disestablish
the reservation because Congress did not draft a statute that called
for the total surrender of tribal interests in the land.141
4. State Historical Practice Does Not Prove
Disestablishment
In support of its position, Oklahoma further argued that the
historical practices of prosecution and demographic compilation of
the land at issue would be enough to prove disestablishment.142 The
majority found that Oklahoma’s argument failed to meet the “law’s
meaning and [created] much potential for mischief.”143 Justice
Gorsuch identified that Oklahoma failed to point out ambiguous
language in the relevant statutes of the case that would lead to the
conclusion that Congress disestablished the reservation.144 Citing
to New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira145 and United States v. Celestine146,
the majority reasoned that a court cannot favor later practices over
the laws actually passed by Congress since the primary goal of
interpretation is to ascertain and follow the original meaning of the
law.147
Oklahoma further argued it had been prosecuting tribal
members for decades and should be able to continue to do so,148
140. Id.
141. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2485 (“missing in all this, however, is a statute
evincing anything like the present and total surrender of all tribal interests in
the affected land.”).
142. See id. at 2468-69 (analyzing Oklahoma’s argument that the
demographics of the land and the historical prosecutorial practices around the
time of and after the enactment of the MCA establishes that Congress
disestablished the Creek reservation).
143. Id. at 2458.
144. Id. at 2474 (explaining that the Court’s charge is to ascertain the
original meaning of the law, recognizing a contextual approach only if there is
an ambiguity or phrase leading to the need to consult usage, customs, and
practices in order to shed light on the context and meaning behind the vague
language at the time it was used).
145. See New Prime, Inc. v. Oliviera, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (describing
the process of statutory interpretation, “it’s a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their
ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute.”).
146. See United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 289-90 (1909) (holding
that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over a crime committed by an
Indian on another Indian because although the crime was committed on land in
which defendant received a patent for the land, the land remained within the
reservation”).
147. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2474 (explaining that Oklahoma is mistaken
by asking the Court to review contemporary or later Congressional events to
approach the question of disestablishment).
148. See 18 U.S.C. §1151 (a)-(c) (1948) (including language that expressly
indicates that the enumerated crimes in the statute committed by Indians on
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despite the MCA’s clear language that indicates otherwise.149 The
majority took issue with this argument, recognizing “[b]y
Oklahoma’s own admission . . . its historical practices . . . didn’t even
try to conform to the MCA, all of which makes the State’s past
prosecutions a meaningless guide for determining what counted as
Indian country.”150
Writing arguendo, Justice Gorsuch entertained Oklahoma’s
argument151 but took issue with declaring that the reservation was
disestablished without clear legislative intent. Doing so, in the
majority’s opinion, may have undermined the legislative
function.152 Ultimately, “Oklahoma [wa]s without authority under
the MCA to try Indians for crimes committed on restricted
allotments and any reservation.”153 The mere fact that it assumed
jurisdiction for decades over cases that were exclusively federal did
not
render
the
Muscogee
Creek
Nation
reservation
disestablished.154
5. Interpretating the Acts of Congress Should Not Be
Inflected Based on the Costs of Enforcing Them Today
Lastly, the majority addressed Oklahoma’s final argument
that a ruling for McGirt would have severe consequences by
unsettling numerous convictions and frustrating Oklahoma’s future
ability to prosecute crimes committed by tribal members within its
boundaries.155 Justice Gorsuch was firm in his conviction that “the

reservations, allotments, and titles are to be in the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, not the States).
149. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2470 (including Oklahoma’s arguments that
their long historical prosecutorial practice of asserting criminal jurisdiction
over tribal members even for the enumerated crimes of the MCA on contested
lands indicates that the Muscogee Creek Reservation in the Eastern portion of
Oklahoma was disestablished).
150. Id. at 2471.
151. See id. at 2472 (stating that to even follow Oklahoma down their path
of reasoning would create an unjust result).
152. See id. at 2470 (warning of potential federalism issues and explaining
that Courts should not invade on the legislative function by finishing the work
Congress has left undone).
153. Id. at 2472-73.
154. See id. (explaining that just because Oklahoma’s courts were
entertaining sham proceedings over tribal members for years without any
authority to do so does nothing to discern the necessary Congressional statutory
meaning needed to disestablish a reservation).
155. See id. at 2479 (addressing Oklahoma’s argument that an adverse
ruling could lead to roughly 1.8 million of its residents winding up in Indian
country further confusing the prosecutorial power of the state of Oklahoma and
burdening its ability to prosecute future crimes while also reversing a number
of criminal convictions for crimes that are extremely severe i.e., rape,
molestation, murder).
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magnitude of a legal wrong is no reason to perpetuate it.”156 Justice
Gorsuch
addressed Oklahoma’s concerns and advised that
warnings are not a license for the Court to disregard the law.157 The
majority refused to allow the interpretation of Congressional acts
adopted more than 100 years ago to be disregarded merely because
the costs of enforcing them in the present day could have
consequences.158 Justice Gorsuch examined the dangers of allowing
Oklahoma to prevail on this sort of argument and compared this
case to other areas of statutory interpretation.159
The majority recognized that a State exercising jurisdiction
over Native Americans with such persistence that the practice
seems normal would not be permitted in any other area of statutory
interpretation and therefore should not be allowed in this case.160
The majority refused to give priority to a “rule of the strong, [over]
. . . the rule of law”161 and held that the practical concerns of
Oklahoma were not sufficient to demonstrate the disestablishment
of the reservation.162
The majority’s analysis in McGirt is important for the future of
federal tribal rights because it signals a beacon of hope to tribes that
Congress will be held accountable for its promises made in its
treaties.163 This is significant federal recognition for tribal members
of the Muscogee Creek Nation because it validates the proposition
that Oklahoma does not have the authority to criminally prosecute
tribal members for major crimes that were committed in Indian
156. Id. at 2480.
157. See id. at 2481 (suggesting that the interpreting the acts of Congress
requires following precedent and that a textual statutory interpretation best
accomplishes the goal of following the law).
158. See id. (refusing to disregard Congressional intent in statutory
interpretation simply because there may be consequences adverse to the state
of Oklahoma’s prosecutorial practices).
159. See id. at 2469 (listing the potential consequences of allowing the
practical advantages of continuing Oklahoma’s prosecutorial practices over the
tribe to overcome the written law and arguing that the State would cause many
Indian landowners to lose their titles to their properties by fraudulent practices
and it would occur so frequently that the true original owner would be soon
forgotten and that allowing this to be permitted in a case of statutory
interpretation would create a rule of the strong willed and not a rule of the
written law).
160. Id. at 2474.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 248 (refusing to allow the practical concerns of Oklahoma to
overcome the required express congressional intent to disestablish a
reservation). The Court pointed out that Oklahoma does not offer these
justifications in order to shed light to resolve the meaning of ambiguous
language in a statute, but does so to insist that the evidence demonstrated the
disestablishment of the reservation. Id. Ultimately, the Court ultimately rejects
this line of reasoning and holds that the reservation was not disestablished
merely because Oklahoma took unlawful control and advantage over Native
members. Id.
163. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459.
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country, while also assuring tribal members that they will be
criminally prosecuted either by their own tribe or the federal
government.

D. Chief Justice Roberts’ Dissenting Opinion
In interpreting congressional intent, Chief Justice John
Roberts, joined by Justices Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and
Clarence Thomas, agreed with the majority in that the Court should
first “start with the statutory text [then] we also examine all the
circumstances surrounding the opening of a reservation.”164 Then,
the court will
look to any unequivocal evidence of the contemporaneous and
subsequent understanding of the status of the reservation by
members and non-members, as well as the United States and
the State [and that] [t]hese inquiries include . . . the history
surrounding the passage of the relevant Act as well as the
subsequent demographic history and treatment of the lands at
issue.165
Chief Justice Roberts criticized the majority for refusing “to
confront the cumulative import of all of Congress’s actions.”166 He
argued that every case that has considered disestablishment in the
past has “considered extratextual sources . . . because, while it is
well established that Congress’s intent must be clear . . . the
appropriate inquiry does not focus on the statutory text alone.”167
1. Congress Enacted a Series of Statutes Strongly
Suggesting Congress’ Intent to Divest the Lands of
Reservation Status
Chief Justice Roberts insisted that respect for the legislature
required the Court to look at what Congress actually did, “not
search in vain for what it might have done or did on other
occasions.”168 In doing so, he gathered a series of statutes and
argued that the statutes, taken together, clearly demonstrated
“Congress’s intent to terminate the reservation and create a new
State [of Oklahoma] in its place.”169 Beginning in 1890 and peaking
when Oklahoma entered statehood, he insisted that Congress
establish a system of laws that was uniform for both Native
164. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2486 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Hagen v.
Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 412 (1994).
165. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2482-83 (citing Hagen, 510 U.S. at 412; Parker,
136 S. Ct. at 1082).
166. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2482-83.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2490.
169. Id.
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Americans and non-Natives, and in doing so, Congress dismantled
both the Muscogee Creek Nation’s government and the tribal courts
while extinguishing the Muscogee Creek Nation’s title to the
lands.170
In support of his argument that the Muscgoee Creek Nation
had been disestablished, Chief Justice Roberts highlighted a
number of historical events that took away tribal authority.171 First,
he pointed to the enactment of the Curtis Act as the initial step in
disestablishing the Muscogee Creek Nation.172 The dissolving of the
Muscogee Creek Nation’s judicial system indicated that Congress
intended to completely excise the authority of Muscogee Creek
Nation leaders from the authority to govern its own members.173
Next, he pointed to how Congress took drastic steps to divest the
tribes of their interests to govern their own people and divest the
lands of its reservation status,174 Congress “incorporated the
Nation’s members into a new political community,”175 Oklahoma.176
The Enabling Act, Chief Justice Roberts insisted, transferred all
pending cases in the territorial courts not involving federal law to
“the new Oklahoma state courts.”177 Through these various acts, he
reasoned that Congress “erased the geographic boundaries that
once defined the Creek territory.”178
Chief Justice Roberts criticized the majority for refusing to
identify the cumulative force of these statutes to determine
Congressional intent and instead evaluated each statute in
isolation.179 By failing to “consider the full picture of what Congress
accomplished,”180 he insisted the majority reached an erroneous
result.181
170. See id. at 2492 (explaining that Congress established a legal system for
both Indians and non-Indians, dismantled the government and tribal courts for
the Creek Nation, extinguished their title to the treaty lands, and incorporated
Creek tribal members into the state of Oklahoma).
171. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2490 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Act of May
2, 1890 § 31, 26 Stat. 96).
172. McGirt, 140 S. Ct.at 2490 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Act of June
27, 1898 § 28, 30 Stat. 83 at 504-05).
173. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2491 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (insisting that
Congress intended to abrogate tribal authority and did so by radically
disassembling the tribal judicial system, allowing no statute by the tribes to be
valid unless the President of the United States endorsed it, and abolishing
tribal taxes).
174. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2497-99 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing
that Congress’s actions strongly indicate that Congress intentionally meant to
dispossess the lands at issue of reservation status).
175. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2490 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2493 (citing § 16, 17, 20 34 Stat. 276 at 276-77).
178. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2493 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2494.
181. Id. at 2493.
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2. The Demographics Indicate There is No Reservation
Chief Justice Roberts further suggested that the land at issue
in this case had long lost its Indian character and that the character
of land may be indicative of diminishment.182 He was of the opinion
that demographics could “signify a diminished reservation.”183
Because the subsequent demographic history of lands may provide
more insight as to the meaning of Congressional action, he found it
persuasive that “[c]ontinuing from statehood [of Oklahoma] to the
present, the population of the lands [in question] has remained
approximately 85%-95% non-Indian.”184 He insisted that precedent
required the Court to consider the demographic history of land for
disestablishment purposes, and the majority’s failure to address
this was an error.185
3. Oklahoma’s Prosecutions Were Long and Lawful
Chief Justice Roberts noted that once admitted as a state,
“Oklahoma immediately began prosecuting serious crimes
committed by Indians in the new state courts, and the federal
government immediately ceased prosecuting such crimes in federal
court.”186 He criticized the majority for its failure to presume that
government officials exercise their duties in accordance with the
law, and here Oklahoma prosecutors should be given the benefit of
the doubt.187 He also found it persuasive that the tribal members’
failed to fight back against state prosecutions188 and that this
demonstrated that Congress did not intend the Muscogee Creek
reservation to persist and that Oklahoma’s prosecutions were
valid.189
For more support, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that for
“113 years, Oklahoma has asserted jurisdiction over the former
182. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (insisting that
“[w]here non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reservation and
the area has long since lost its Indian character, we have acknowledged that de
facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred”).
183. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 357 (1998).
184. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2500 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
185. See id. (stating that the Court has determined that demographic
history in a disestablishment case is an important consideration and further
explaining that disestablishment cases require the Court use a variety of tools
to determine Congressional intent).
186. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2496 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2497.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 2496, n. 5 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
contemporaneous understanding of tribal leaders is probative evidence in
determining Congressional intent because it demonstrates the understanding
of the reservation’s status by its own members).
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Indian Territory on the understanding that it [was] not a
reservation, without any objection by [the Creeks] until recently.”190
He specifically insisted that the “State’s exercise of unquestioned
jurisdiction over the disputed area since the passage of the Enabling
Act”191 deserved “weight as an indication of the intended purpose of
the Act.”192
Finally, he argued that using a broader contextual inquiry
required the Court to find that the failure of the Department of
Indian Affairs to attempt to exercise jurisdiction was a factor
entitled to weight.193 He was also worried about the practical
consequences of the majority’s decision because a “finding that the
land remains Indian country seriously burdens the administration
of state and local governments.”194
Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern that the Court’s
decision could result in jurisdictional challenges being raised by
defendants who have committed grievous offenses.195 He was
worried that the majority’s holding would ultimately undermine
Oklahoma’s criminal governance.196 Specifically, he insisted that
the majority’s “decision may destabilize the governance of vast
swathes of Oklahoma.”197 Chief Justice Roberts suggested that state
authority is diluted in important aspects when it contains land that
is designated as a reservation because “state regulation of even nonIndians is preempted if it runs afoul of federal Indian policy.’”198 He
argued Oklahoma had an important interest in the Court affirming
the legitimacy of the state court’s decisions.199

190. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2499 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 2499 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 599, n. 20, 604 (1977)).
192. McGirt, 140 S. Ct at 2499 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal
quotations omitted).
193. Id.
194. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470.
195. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2500 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Court’s decision draws into question thousands of convictions obtained by
the State for crimes involving Indian defendants . . . [spanning] across several
decades.”).
196. See id. at 2501 (suggesting that these convictions for serious crimes are
“now subject to jurisdictional challenges, leading to the potential release of
numerous individuals found guilty under state law of the most grievous
offenses.”).
197. Id.
198. See id. (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
142, 144-45 (1980)) (arguing that state regulation of non-Indians is preempted
if it runs afoul of federal Indian policy and tribal sovereignty based on a
nebulous balancing test).
199. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2501 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining
how the majority’s ruling transforms state and tribal authority and leads to
greater uncertainty of who has the power to prosecute nearly 270,000 people).
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4. Roberts’s Conclusion
Chief Justice Roberts concluded his dissenting opinion by
arguing that “Congress disestablished any Creek reservation more
than 100 years ago . . . [and] Oklahoma therefore had jurisdiction
to prosecute McGirt.”200 Unsurprisingly, given his philosophy of
judicial restraint throughout his opinion, he adopted a deferential
view to the government officials’ actions.201 Throughout his
analysis, Chief Justice Roberts adopted a starkly different approach
than the majority, using a contextual inquiry and relying primarily
on Congressional acts taken as a whole to conclude that Congress’s
intention was to disestablish the Creek reservation.202
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion may persuade the
Supreme Court in the future to interpret acts of Congress by using
a contextual approach. However, this approach may lead to more
confusion in tribal jurisdiction cases. Thus, more unpredictability
in the outcomes of jurisdictional challenges in the tribal context.

E. Justice Thomas’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas joined Chief Justice Roberts in the substantive
portions of his dissenting opinion but briefly addressed a separate
procedural defect he took issue with. Specifically, he found that the
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment against
McGirt.203 He mentions “where the judgment of a state court rests
upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal
in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is
independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the
judgment.”204
1. The Supreme Court Reversed a State Court Judgment
that it Has No Jurisdiction to Review
McGirt failed to raise the jurisdictional issue previously on
direct appeal, and it was thus waived for further review because the
200. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2502 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
201. See id. at 2497 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme
Court is to afford great deference to government officials by presuming that they
exercise their official duties in accordance with the law and criticizing the
majority’s accusations of the state of Oklahoma lacking good faith in its
prosecutorial practices because it is inconsistent with the correct analysis of
presumption in favor of officials).
202. See id. at 2482 (using a contextual approach that takes into
consideration legislative history, subsequent demographics, and circumstances
surrounding the passing of the legislation).
203. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2502 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1038, n. 4 (1983) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935))).
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court failed to find grounds to excuse his default.205 Despite the
waiver, Justice Thomas argued that the Supreme Court wholly
“lack[ed] jurisdiction to disturb the state court’s judgment.”206 Even
if the Court were to ignore the fact that the Oklahoma state court’s
decision was based on state procedural grounds, the Court could not
presume jurisdiction here.207
2. Thomas’s Conclusion
Even though he recognized that the resolution of this dispute
was an important one, he insisted that the Court must keep “the
Judiciary’s power within its proper constitutional sphere.’”208
Justice Thomas found that “[b]ecause the Oklahoma court’s
‘judgment does not depend upon the decision of any federal
question[,] we have no power to disturb it.’”209 Justice Thomas’s
approach to resolving McGirt lies in a technicality that the majority
opinion, as well as Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion, fails
to fully address.210

IV. ARGUMENT
Although a majority of the Supreme Court took a step towards
recognizing tribal sovereignty in holding that Oklahoma did not
have the authority to prosecute McGirt, its holding falls short of
fully honoring traditional Native American values. Since many
tribes believe there is a deep connection between justice and
205. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2503 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (recounting the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’s holding that Jimcy McGirt’s claim was
procedural barred under Oklahoma state law due to his failure to not previously
raise it on direct appeal).
206. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 2504 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 735-36 (1991)).
208. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2504 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704-05 (2013)); see also Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1038, n. 4 (1983) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S.
207, 210 (1935)) (explaining subject matter jurisdiction and recognizing where
the judgment of a state court rests upon one federal ground and one state
ground, federal jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the
federal ground and adequate to support the judgment).
209. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2504 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Enterprise Irrigation Dist. V. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164
(1917)) (suggesting that nothing in the majority’s judgment was based on
federal law and insisting that the majority is second guessing the independence
of the Oklahoma state court).
210. See generally McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2456-2482; McGirt, 140 S. Ct., 24822503 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (failing to express assent or disagreement to
Justice Thomas’s claim that the Court does lacks jurisdiction to decide this case,
while the majority opinion mentions Justice Thomas’s argument in footnote 15,
it does not elaborate on its reasoning of its rejection in the opinion itself).
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spirituality, the Anglo-American justice system fails to adequately
recognize these values. The tribal philosophy on justice has an
emphasis on “healing, [so it follows that] . . . reintegrating
individuals into their community, is more important than
punishment,”211 in contrast to the Anglo-American justice system.
To conclude the analysis of the issue addressed in McGirt and
propose an alternative solution, first, another brief look at the
Major Crimes Act is needed to contrast the Anglo-American justice
system with the philosophy of restorative justice. Next, my Personal
Analysis will explain why restorative justice principles are essential
to many tribes and how the implementation of these policies can
lead to more recognition for these oppressed groups. Lastly, this
section will demonstrate how Jimcy McGirt’s case could have been
an opportunity for the Supreme Court to limit the scope of the MCA
and implement a holding that better appreciates the restorative
justice philosophies of the Muscogee Creek Nation and Native
American tribes more generally.
In 1885, the MCA was enacted to place certain crimes under
federal jurisdiction, given that they are committed by a Native
American citizen on a federally recognized Native territory.212 The
policy behind the enactment of this statute was that federal
regulation “is rooted in the unique status of Indians as ‘a separate
people’ with their own political institutions.”213 This statute was
drafted by Congress to make clear that the states did not have the
jurisdiction to prosecute Native Americans for major crimes
committed between tribal members and on their territory.214
However, it is unclear whether, under this statute, federal courts
have jurisdiction exclusive of tribes.215 This uncertainty puts the
rights of many Native Americans to be criminally tried by their own
tribes at risk — an important function of a sovereign nation. The
211. Laura Mirsky, Restorative Justice Practices of Native American, First
Nation and Other Indigenous People of North America: Part One, INT’L INST.
FOR RESTORATIVE PRAC. 1 (Apr. 27, 2004), www.iirp.edu/pdf/natjust1.pdf
[perma.cc/W4Y4-NS28].
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1948) (requiring that the crime be committed by
a Native American person on an Indian territory for this federal statute to be
applicable).
213. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977).
214. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 647 (1978) (holding that the
federal courts have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over the states to prosecute
Native Americans for crimes committed between them on Native American
reservation or other Indian country).
215. See Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) (petitioner
challenging tribal jurisdiction and authority to prosecute for manslaughter, the
Court holding that her tribal membership subjects her to the tribe’s procedures
consistent with the Indian Civil Rights Act); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676, 697 (1990) (holding that Indian tribes could not prosecute Indians who
were members of different tribes for the crimes that have been committed by
the different tribe members on their own reservation).
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Court had an opportunity to address this issue in McGirt, and its
failure to do so is regrettable.
The Anglo-American justice system has its roots in English
common law and has approximately four theories of punishment,
“(1) retributive (2) deterrent, (3) preventive, and (4) reformatory.”216
Retribution focuses on the punishment of an offender.217 Deterrence
serves to prevent a repeat offender or another person from
participating in a crime by increasing the certainty of a severe
punishment so that they are deterred from the conduct by fear of
punishment.218 A preventive theory of punishment focuses on the
individual offender and involves either surveillance, execution, or
imprisonment to prevent them from committing a similar offense.219
A reformatory theory of punishment, out of the four theories listed
above, most closely resembles the peacemaking philosophies of
many tribes and has an emphasis on the rehabilitation of the
criminal by educating and treating them in an individualistic
way.220 These theories are abstract, and in any given case, there is
sure to be more than one that is applicable in the sentencing of a
criminal defendant.221
In contrast, restorative justice is an alternative approach to
punishment that is at the heart of this Note’s proposed solution to
deciding this case. As such, a comparison to the Anglo-American
philosophy is necessary. Restorative justice differs from the AngloAmerican form of punishment by conceptualizing a crime as a

216. Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Anglo-American Philosophies of Penal
Law, 1 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 354 (1910).
217. See Alec Walen, Retributive Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Jun.
18,
2014),
www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-retributive/
[perma.cc/AK9W-ZK8Q] (explaining that retributive theory is based on the
premise that “those who commit wrongful acts, especially serious crimes, should
be punished even if punishing them would produce no other good”).
218. See Valerie Wright, Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating
Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, SENTENCING PROJ. 2 (Nov. 2010)
(explaining policy of deterrence and how it may fail because it assumes that
human beings are rational beings who consider adverse consequences of their
conduct before they commit a crime).
219. See Willoughby, supra note 218, at 369 (explaining preventive theory
and the methods used to accomplish this theory of punishment often include
execution, imprisonment, or continued surveillance of the convicted person to
make sure that they do not continue to participate in illegal conduct).
220. See Tanu Priya, Reformative Theory of Punishment, ACADEMIKE (Sept.
2, 2014), www.lawctopus.com/academike/reformative-theory-of-punishment/
[perma.cc/JQ6X-MPVU] (describing the theory behind reformation in the penal
system and how it attempts to protect the basic human rights of a convicted
person by changing the offenders’ behavior through education and treatment to
reduce the likelihood of the offender committing a future crime).
221. See Willoughby, supra note 218, at 369 (mentioning that these theories
are not mutually exclusive and that it is rationally impossible to select any
single theory of punishment and declare it in a system of penal justice that
should be the sole motive for both its enactment and its enforcement).
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violation of trust between members of a community to restore
relationships and establish harmony.222 In traditional Native
American culture, “justice, healing, along with reintegrating
individuals into their community, is paramount . . . [and it] involves
bringing together victims, offenders, and their supporters to resolve
a problem.”223 In many tribes, “there is a deep connection between
justice and spirituality; [and] harmony and balance are essential to
both.”224 The key to restorative justice lies in its principle that crime
is not only a morally-wrong act, but is also an offense against
human relationships.225
Unlike Anglo-American culture that “consists of an elective
identity added to the essential American character,”226 Native
American culture is “pervasive, encircling, [and] all-inclusive.”227
Thus, it serves as no surprise that the Anglo-American justice
system differs greatly from tribal philosophies because the very idea
of justice holds an entirely different meaning. The Anglo-American
perception of justice is “relegated to one institution, and all other
things are left to a marketplace of religion and culture that prospers
or fails depending on how individuals choose to exercise the liberty
given to them under American law,”228 whereas the tribal concept
of justice stems from the human spirit.229
As eluded to above, the main departure of Anglo-American law
and restorative justice lies in the relation of the punishment with
law and morality. In the Anglo-American system, “legal rights and
duties are also moral rights and duties, but they are recognized by
the law not . . . because they are such, but . . . because their
enforcement is deemed advantageous.”230 Under this system, a
specific act is prohibited because public safety—not morality—
222. See J.F Meyer. History Repeats Itself: Restorative Justice in Native
American Communities, 14 J. OF CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 42 (1998) (explaining
the framework for Native American legal systems and discussing the policy
behind restorative justice measures in a tribal context).
223. Mirsky, supra note 213, at 1.
224. Id.
225. See Restorative Justice On-Line Notebook, NAT’L CRIM. JUST.
REFERENCES SERV. (Nov. 2007), www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/242196.pdf
[perma.cc/BS6L-QB9Y] (listing the principles of restorative justice: crime is an
offense against human relationships, victims and the community are central to
justice processes, the first priority of justice processes is to assist victims, the
second priority is to restore the community)).
226. Carey Vicenti. The Reemergence of Tribal Society and Traditional
Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 134 (1995).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id. (explaining justice as a concept “in which all aspects of the
person and his or her society are integrated . . . [and] [e]very action in daily life
is read to have meaning and implication to the individual and guides how . . .
[they interact] with tribal society or [fulfill] obligations imposed by society, law,
and religion.”).
230. Willoughby, supra note 218, at 371.
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depends on it.231 In contrast, restorative justice is closely tied with
morality. Restorative justice focuses on the individual and
emphasizes that no human is capable of being thrown away for an
act; that a community is obliged to promote the healing and wellbring of its members.232 The process of restorative justice aims to
focus on the individual, by separating the criminal action from the
person who committed it.233 To many tribes, “spirituality helps to
connect and bind [members] to each other as a community, as a
tribe, and as a nation . . . [and] it clarifies relationships and is what
makes healing happen.”234
There is no question that tribal courts and their notions of
justice differ greatly from that of the Anglo-American
formulations.235 Because of the differing ideals and philosophies
behind these two concepts of justice, it is a disservice to force the
Anglo-American penal system on Native American tribes. It may be
that these tribes are better honored by the recognition of selfgovernance to foster restorative justice philosophies.
Because a stark contrast exists between the Anglo-American
penal system and the philosophy of restorative justice, the type of
punishment a tribal member receives for crimes committed against
another tribal member needs to be reconsidered. In restorative
justice, “there is a deep connection between justice and
spirituality,”236 and the Anglo-American justice system is
inconsistent with this because punishment in this context is not
viewed with morality. Therefore, a tribal member being prosecuted
for a crime committed against another tribal member by the federal
government is inconsistent with this justice ideology.237
231. See id. (recognizing that something is “prohibited by the law, not
because it is considered sinful, as tested by some moral standard, but because
the safety or welfare of society demands it”).
232. See generally GORDON BAZEMORE, RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE:
REPAIRING HARM AND TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES, CENTRE FOR JUSTICE &
RECONCILIATION (2015) (explaining how restorative justice leads to restoration
of harmony for the community and allows both the victim and offender to heal).
233. See Mirsky, supra note 213, at 4 (identifying that the process of
restorative justice is not focused on law and principles, but rather that the
process is paramount, noting that disputes are better resolved by the idea of
relationships instead of resorting to rules for guidance on how to punish a
wrongdoer).
234. Id. at 6.
235. See id. at 3-4 (highlighting the differences between Anglo-American
and Indian justice systems, recognizing the Indian tradition as grounded in the
process of justice and the fundamental preservation of relationships within the
tribal community).
236. Id. at 1.
237. See Carol A. Hand et al., Restorative Justice: The Indigenous Justice
System, 15 CONTEMP. JUST. REVIEW ISSUES IN CRIM., SOC., & RESTORATIVE
JUST. 4 (2012) (summarizing the different beliefs about achieving justice,
comparing the traditional Indigenous restorative justice system with the
European-based system practiced in the present-day United States).
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The MCA is overly broad in its application and should only
grant federal courts criminal jurisdiction for major crimes
committed between a tribal member and a non-tribal member.
Failure to recognize Native American traditional values in the
context of restorative justice will only further oppress a culture that
has already been forced to adapt to the Anglo-American way of life.
As such, major crimes committed between tribal members are more
appropriately left to be adjudicated and dealt with under exclusive
tribal jurisdiction.
In McGirt, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed Jimcy
McGirt’s Oklahoma state conviction due to lack of prosecutorial
jurisdiction because of the MCA.238 Instead of spending a significant
amount of its opinion on recounting the events Oklahoma claimed
gave rise to Congress disestablishing a reservation, the Supreme
Court could have used this case as a vehicle to limit the scope and
application of the MCA. Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee
Creek Nation, was convicted of molesting his wife’s four-year-old
daughter, another member of the Creek Nation.239
In filing an amicus brief in support of reversing McGirt’s
conviction, the Muscogee Creek Nation made it clear that they were
not interested in preventing Mr. McGirt from being held
accountable for his crimes. 240 Instead, they argued that the outcome
would implicate the Tribe’s interests in how crimes are prosecuted
on tribal lands moving forward. The Muscogee Creek Nation sought
to participate in this case in order to advocate for their own
member’s tribal rights by seeking judicial and federal vindication of
their right to prosecute their own members at the exclusion of
Oklahoma.241
Instead of using this case as an opportunity to address whether
the federal statute should apply at the exclusion of the tribes in
criminal cases involving two tribal members, the Court simply held
that the federal government, to the exclusion of Oklahoma, had the
authority to prosecute McGirt.242 Perhaps the members of the
Muscogee Creek Nation would have preferred to handle Jimcy

238. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2456 (holding that the judgment of the Court
of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma had to be reversed because the federal courts,
not the Oklahoma state courts, had the jurisdiction to criminally prosecute
him).
239. See id. at 2459 (stating that McGirt’s crimes were committed on lands
described as the Creek reservation and that the offender as well as the victim
were registered members of the Muscogee Creek Nation).
240. Id. at 2460.
241. See generally Brief for Muscogee (Creek) Nation as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 54 (filing an amicus brief to support Petitioner Jimcy McGirt’s
argument that the State of Oklahoma did not have the authority to criminally
prosecute him and therefore cannot criminally prosecute other Indians for
crimes committed in Indian country).
242. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459.
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McGirt’s sentencing in a manner more consistent with their tribe’s
values. Although the Muscogee Creek Nation did not condone
McGirt’s criminal behavior, they did not clearly express agreement
with the sentence imposed upon him by the Oklahoma courts. Given
the differences between Anglo-American penal theories and the
general philosophies of restorative justice, it is not implausible to
contemplate that the Muscogee Creek Nation may have preferred
Jimcy McGirt to face his community in order to promote healing for
the victims of his actions, as well as McGirt himself.

V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether or not the Muscogee Creek Nation
would actually implement a restorative justice proceeding in
McGirt’s case is inconsequential. What is paramount is the
Muscogee Creek Nation’s values surrounding the criminal
sentencing of one of its own members against another is essential
to its very existence as a tribe. In rendering its decision, the
Supreme Court’s failure to narrow the scope and application of the
MCA may have precluded healing for the tribal community. The
Muscogee Creek Nation, as well as many other tribes, deserve to
exercise discretion in how they want their members to be criminally
prosecuted — it should not be left to an institution that is far
removed from traditional tribal values and promotes an AngloAmerican penal system.
The theft of ancestral tribal lands, the genocide of tribal
members, public hostility towards Native peoples, and irreversible
oppression – these are the realities that every indigenous person
has had to face because of colonization. By recognizing and
respecting the Muscogee Creek Nation’s authority to criminally
sentence its own members, the United States Supreme Court could
have taken a small step towards righting these wrongs.

